CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-ERODING DEFENDANT AUTONOMY:

ATTORNEYS HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHOR-

ITY TO DETERMINE ISSUES TO BE ARGUED ON APPEAL-Jones v.

Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
The right to counsel clause of the sixth amendment' permits a
defendant to interpose a shield of skilled legal assistance between
himself and the resources of the prosecution. 2 In cases spanning the
past fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has extolled the
benefits of representation by counsel, and has expanded indigents'
access to this representation at critical stages of criminal proceedings.' The Court has also recognized, on the other hand, that the
sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to autonomy in
the presentation of his defense.' Courts have managed to accomodate both of these rights at the trial level, requiring counsel to defer
to the client on substantive matters, 5 but also recognizing that strategic or tactical decisions properly reside with the skilled advocate.6 At
the appellate stage, however, where the distinction between decisions
relating to matters of substance and those that are purely strategic is
unclear,' the rights of defendants and the duties of counsel become
difficult to reconcile, especially when a defendant wishes to take an
active role in his case.
In Jones v. Barnes,8 the Supreme Court addressed the allocation
of decision making authority between attorney and client at the apI The sixth amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
2 The prosecution will ordinarily have its case against the accused well established
before defense counsel even begins to prepare. See STANDARDS RELATING To CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1 commentary (2d ed. 1982). Defense
counsel must then provide the expertise that the defendant lacks but the system requires
to ensure a fair contest. See infra note 64 for comment on the need to protect a defendant who is unfamiliar with legal proceedings.
3 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 851
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
4 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); accordMcKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S.
Ct. 944 (1984).
5 See i)nfa notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.

7 Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 comment (Final Draft
1982) (noting distinction between "objectives" and "means" and difficulty sometimes
encountered when trying to distinguish between them). As used in this casenote, substantive matters are those that involve the theory and content of a defense or an appeal.
Strategic or tactical concerns are those that arise while ascertaining the most promising
method of presenting substantive theory.
8 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
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pellate level. The issue facing the Court was whether an attorney's
decision not to raise nonfrivolous claims requested by his client rendered his assistance constitutionally ineffective. 9
In 1976, David Barnes was convicted by a jury of assault and
robbery.1 ° Michael Melinger was appointed to represent Barnes in
his appeal." Barnes provided Melinger with a list of four claims that
he believed should be raised, 2 one of which was ineffective assistance
of trial counsel.' 3 Melinger responded with a list of seven issues that
he believed would be most viable on appeal. 4 That list did not include the ineffectiveness claim proposed by Barnes.' 5 In his appellate
brief, Melinger argued three of the points that he had enumerated
earlier, and subsequently addressed only those issues at oral argument. 6 Melinger also submitted a pro se brief that he had received
from Barnes.' 7 The appeal proved unsuccessful, however, and fur9 Id at 3310, 3314 n.7.
10 Id.at 3310.

11 Id
12 Id Barnes proposed the following grounds for appeal: 1) suppression of the victim
Butts's identification testimony should have been required; 2) psychiatric evidence related to Butts's credibility was improperly excluded; 3) his trial counsel was ineffective;
and 4) the District Attorney's cross-examination was improper. Barnes v. Jones, 665
F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
13 Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3310. Barnes premised this claim on errors of omission of his
trial counsel. He first maintained that his trial attorney was inadequately prepared.
Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983). Second,
Barnes contended that an offer of proof should have been made to show that Butts's
history of blackouts was relevant to his ability to make a reliable identification. Barnes,
103 S. Ct. at 3310. In addition, Barnes testified that he had spent the evening of the
robbery with his father; however, his attorney failed either to call Barnes's father as a
witness or to mention the alibi in his summation. Barnes, 665 F.2d at 430. Lastly, Barnes
claimed his counsel should have objected to the prosecution's inflammatory summation.
Id See id at 435 n.5 for an excerpt of that summation.
'4 Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3310. The list included the following arguments: 1) psychiatric evidence was improperly excluded; 2) the summation by the prosecutor was improper; 3) the trial judge's examination of Barnes was improper; 4) the accessorial
charge requested by defense counsel was improperly denied; and 5) the finding of facts
establishing Butts's prior familiarity with Barnes was insufficient to validate his identification of Barnes. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.Ct. 3308
(1983).
15 Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
Melinger had rejected the claim because it necessitated the introduction of facts that
existed at the time of trial but were not included in the record and thus could not be
used on appeal. Id The Second Circuit found Melinger's rejection ill-founded because
of the availability of a coram nob:i proceeding, which allows counsel to return to the trial
court to supplement the record. Id at 430 n.1 (citation omitted).
16 Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3311. The three claims argued were "improper exclusion of
psychiatric evidence, failure to suppress Butts' identification testimony, and improper
cross-examination . . .by the trial judge." Id
17 Id Barnes independently submitted two additional pro se briefs. Id

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:164

ther leave to appeal was denied."8
Barnes then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, in
which he reasserted the four claims that he had suggested earlier to
Melinger."9 The district court found the petition to be without
merit.2" Its holding was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 '
After two unsuccessful challenges in state court,2 2 Barnes petitioned the New York Court of Appeals to reconsider its denial of
leave to appeal, alleging for the first time ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel. 2 3 Reconsideration was denied. 24 Undaunted, Barnes filed a

second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court,
introducing his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in
the Federal system.2 5 The district court denied the writ, concluding
that Melinger's performance had satisfied the "farce and mockery"
standard, as well as a "reasonable competence" standard, of effectiveness. 26 The district court deemed it Melinger's duty to exercise his
professional judgment when selecting issues for appeal.2 7
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that appointed appellate
counsel was required to argue nonfrivolous issues proposed by a defendant. 28 The circuit court observed that Barnes's claim of ineffective legal assistance at trial was colorable. 29 The court further found
18 Id
19 Id See supra note 12 for the claims proposed by Barnes.
20 Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3311. The district court used the farce and mockery standard
to gauge the effectiveness of Barnes's trial counsel. Id; see also infra note 77 (discussing
farce and mockery standard). But cf. in/fa note 79 (farce and mockery no longer used by
any Federal circuit).
21 Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3311.
22 Id Barnes filed a motion for collateral review of his sentence, which was denied.
Leave to appeal this decision also was denied. Id.
23 Id
24 Id
25 Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
26 Id See n/fra notes 78-80 and accompanying text for discussion of the reasonable
competence standard.
27 Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
28 Id at 429. Circuit Judge Oakes, writing for the majority, reasoned that
appointed counsel's unwillingness to present particular arguments at appellant's request functions not only to abridge defendant's right to counsel on
appeal, but also to limit the defendant's constitutional right of equal access
to the appellate process in order to redress asserted errors at trial-the very
right that an appointment of appellate counsel was designed to preserve.
Id at 433-34.
29 Id at 434-35. The Second Circuit employed a reasonable competence standard to
evaluate Barnes's trial counsel, the same standard employed by New York courts. The
circuit court noted that because the determination of trial counsel's competence was for
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that Melinger's failure to raise that nonfrivolous claim rendered his
appellate performance ineffective.3 0 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that counsel appointed to pursue an appeal is not required to
raise all nonfrivolous issues urged by a defendant.3 1
The Court's ability to address the precise issue posed in Barnes
was inhibited by a paucity of precedent. Interpretation of the right
to counsel clause has spawned two distinct branches of case law. The
first, peculiar to indigents, addresses the constitutional foundations
32
for appointing counsel at different stages of criminal proceedings.
Once a defendant has been represented by counsel, appointed or retained, courts are faced with the task of determining whether that
representation comported with the level of effectiveness demanded
by the sixth amendment. 3 Because sixth amendment considerations
are implicated only at the trial level, 34 both branches of case lawappointment and effectiveness-have focused predominantly on that
stage. 5 However, neither branch provides guidance, other than by
analogy, as to how decision making authority should be allocated
between attorney and client on appeal.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO SELFREPRESENTATION

While an indigent's right to counsel at trial is firmly rooted in
the sixth amendment, 36 the Supreme Court has yet to establish assistance of counsel on appeal as a constitutional right. Indeed, the question of whether there exists a right to an appeal at all has not been
considered by the Court since the sixth amendment was made applithe purpose of obtaining a state court review, the district court erred in not applying the
appropriate state standard. Id The Second Circuit has since abandoned the farce and
mockery standard and has adopted a reasonableness standard. See Trapnell v. United
States, 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1983).
30 Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 433, 435 (2d Cir. 1981) (relying on Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983).
31 Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
32 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to
counsel applicable to state defendants through fourteenth amendment), rev'g Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (equal protection
clause requires right to appointment on first appeal as of right); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1935) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment requires appointment of

counsel for defendants at state trials).
33 For a discussion of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel
and standards of effectiveness, see infa notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
34 The Supreme Court has never held that the sixth amendment is applicable to an
appeal. But see infra note 37.
35 But see in/fa text accompanying notes 44-49 & 129-32.
36 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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cable to the states, and its status remains somewhat unclear." The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, however, that the disparity between the system's treatment of indigents and of those who can
afford appellate counsel is sufficient to warrant application of the
equal protection clause.3" Thus, when a system provides for appellate review, equal protection principles demand that such review not
39
be for-eclosed because of indigency.
In Grftin v. Ilhnois,4 the Supreme Court held that conditioning
an appeal, granted as of right, on a defendant's ability to pay for a
transcript violated the equal protection rights of those defendants
who could not afford one.4 The Court asserted that access to an
appellate forum may not be made contingent upon a defendant's
ability to pay for it.4 2 This principle was applied by the Court in
Douglas v. CalfoMIa4 3 to the appointment of counsel on a first appeal

as of right." The Douglas Court struck down a California statute
that conditioned appointment upon a court's initial determination
that assistance of counsel would benefit either the court or the defendant.45 That procedure was held unconstitutionally discriminatory because it absented from scrutiny non-indigents, who were
37 Compare McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("[Rleview by an appellate
court of the final judgment in a criminal case. . . is not. . . a necessary element of due

process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to allow
such a review.") with Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3315 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (if question
of constitutional right to appeal presented to Court now, it would probably find constitutional right to some form of review) and Strazzella, Inefct've Assistance of Counsel Claims:

New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIz. L. REv. 443, 465 (1977) (suggesting that Court, if faced
with issue, might be willing to recognize right to appeal, with attendant right to counsel,
as "present day basic constitutional right[s]").
38 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963) (employing equal protection
principles where disparity between indigents' and non-indigents' access to fair appellate
review significant); cf Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967)(noting disparity
between "rights and opportunities" afforded paying defendents and indigents). The
equal protection clause provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1.
39 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Butcf
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)(equal protection clause does not require appointment of counsel on discretionary appeal).
40 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
41 Id at 18-19. The procedure reviewed in Gnfm required that either a bill of exceptions or a certified report of the trial proceedings be submitted to pursue an appeal as of
right. Id at 13. The Gnffm Court found that a transcript was necessary to prepare either
of the two documents. Id at 13-15, 14 n.4.
42 Id at 18.
43 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
44 Id at 356-57.
45 Id
at 355.
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guaranteed appeals replete with briefs and arguments."6 The Court
observed that only indigent defendants were required to prove the
value of counsel and that, when they could not, pro se appeals were
prejudiced by a record marred by the implication that the appeal
was without merit. 7
8 the Supreme Court reFour years later, in Anders v. California,"
quired appointed counsel, seeking to withdraw from appeals that
they believed to be meritless, to submit nonetheless a brief enumerating any plausible grounds for the appeal."9 The Anders Court, alluding to equal protection principles,50 sought to neutralize any
difference between retained and appointed attorneys' commitments
to securing appellate review for their clients.5 '
After nearly five decades of attempting to ensure the availability
of assistance of counsel to indigents, the Court was faced with a different issue. In 1975, in Faretta v. California,52 it was asked to determine whether a state court defendant was constitutionally entitled to
conduct his own defense.53 The Fare/ta Court, relying on the historical preference for self-representation, 5" held that the right to appear
46

Id. at 358. The Court noted that "the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys

the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling
of arguments on his behalf" and "can require the court to listen to argument of counsel
before deciding on the merits, [while] a poor man cannot." Id at 357-58.
47 I. at 355-56, 358. The Douglas Court viewed this prejudicial effect as especially
pernicious, noting that "[a]ny real chance [petitioner] may have had of showing that his
appeal has hidden merit is deprived him when the court decides on an expare examination of the record that the assistance of counsel is not required." Id at 356.
48 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
49 Id at 744. A copy of the so-called "Anders brief" is given to the defendant while
the court determines whether the appeal is "wholly frivolous." If the appeal has merit,
the indigent must be afforded the assistance of counsel. Id
50 See id at 741 (citing Gritm and Douglas). The Anders Court acknowledged the "continuing line of cases . . . concerning discrimination against the indigent defendant on
his first appeal." Id. The Court premised its holding on "[t]he constitutional requirement of substantial equality." Id at 744; see t/hfa note 51.
51 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 745. The Court expressed hope that its holding would
"assure penniless defendants the same rights and opportunities on appeal-as nearly as
is practicable-as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who
are able to afford the retention of private counsel." Id
52 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
53 Id at 807. The Court found it necessary to confirm that there exists a constitutional right to self-representation even though it had previously determined that a defendant may waive the right to counsel. Id at 819 & n. 15. The Court noted that "[t]he
ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist
upon the opposite of that right." Id at 819 n.15 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965)).
54 Se generally id at 821-32 (extensive discussion of history of self-representation in
England and America).
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pro se is implicitly guaranteed by the sixth amendment.5" The Court
described the right to counsel contemplated by the amendment's
drafters as secondary to the more fundamental, though implied, right
to represent oneself.56 The language of the clause, which speaks of
the assistanceof counsel, suggested to the FarettaCourt that the role of
counsel was only intended to supplement a defendant's exercise of
the personal right to defend himself.5 7
The FarettaCourt was faced with a dilemma: It was required to
establish not only the existence of a right of self-representation, but
also the preeminence of that right over the express right to counsel. 58
The Court reconciled its holding with its oft-repeated contention
that assistance of counsel is essential to a fair defense, declaring that
"it is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the
right to the assistance of counsel, [but] quite another to say that a
State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not
want."5 9 The FarettaCourt concluded that once the right to counsel
has been validly waived,6 a defendant is free to conduct his own
defense.6 1
The FarettaCourt acknowledged the discretion of trial courts to
appoint "standby counsel" to assist a pro se defendant. 62 The function of standby counsel, it noted, is to aid a defendant who needs or
Id. at 819.
Id at 829-30. The FarettaCourt concluded that "[t]he right to counsel was clearly
thought to supplement the primary right of the accused to defend himself." Id.
57 Id The FarettaCourt characterized the right to counsel as only one of the "defense
tools" afforded defendants by the sixth amendment. The Court noted that the right to
counsel clause "speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is
still an assistant." Id at 120. The "defense tools" were intended, the Court suggested, to
aid a defendant in his exercise of the personal right to defend. See id.Thus, the "defense
tools" are necessarily not as important as the amendment's primary guarantee-the personal right to defend.
58 See id at 832-33. The Court recognized that
the right of an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the
grain of this Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no
accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the
right to the assistance of counsel. For it is surely true that the basic thesis of
those decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant
a fair trial.
Id.(citations omitted).
55

56

59 Id at 833.

In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court imposed upon trial
courts a duty to ensure the validity of waivers of counsel and to include such determinations in the court record. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465. The Johnson Court defined a valid
waiver as an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id.at 464.
61 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36.
62 Id at 834-35 n.46.
60
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requests help, and to assume control should termination of self-representation become necessary.6 3 Standby counsel, observed the Court,
serves to ensure that the integrity of the judicial system will not be
64
undermined by an unruly or unskilled pro se defense.
Fare//adid not delineate, however, the proper degrees of participation to be assumed by attorney and client when a defendant proceeding pro se is appointed standby counsel.6 5 Many courts have
held that a defendant has no right to insist upon integrating the right
to appear pro se with assistance of counsel.66 Courts' reluctance to
63 Id Recently, the Supreme Court had occasion to define more clearly the role of

standby counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984). Wiggins, a pro se
defendant, claimed that he had been denied his right to self-representation because of
standby counsel's excessive interference in his trial. Id at 947-48. Wiggins claimed that
Faretta limited standby counsel's participation to instances where his aid was solcited by
the defendant. Id. at 950. The Supreme Court disagreed, maintaining that while the
"right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to
allow the presentation of what may, at least occassionally, be the accused's best possible
defense [, b]oth of these objectives can be achieved without categorically silencing
standby counsel." Id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, recognized that "[t]he
pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organizationand content of his own defense, to
make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses,
and to address the court and jury at appropriate points in the trial." Id at 949 (emphasis added). The majority conceded that substantial interference or control by standby
counsel could "erode" the right granted by Faretta,but suggested that such erosion was
possible only when a jury's perception of whether the defendant was carrying out his
own defense was affected. See id at 951.
64 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. Justice Stewart, writing for the Faretta majority,
advocated the employment of standby counsel in response to the fear that pro se defendants might deliberately disrupt trial proceedings and necessitate termination of self-representation because of "obstructionist misconduct." Id at 834.
The integrity of the judicial system may also be undermined by allowing an obviously inept defendant to fend for himself in a legal environment he is inadequately
skilled to confront. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (society's interest in fair and impartial trial requires that defendant be able to counter prosecution);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (one skilled in "science of law" essential to
maintain integrity of system by ensuring fidelity to procedural safeguards perhaps unknown to defendant). Thus, if defendants are found guilty because they are incapable of
defending themselves adequately within the confines of the system, the system is tainted
by even allowing them to try.
65 But compare McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984), in which the Court
clearly characterized the role of standby counsel as properly limited to procedural and
technical matters. Wiggens, 104 S. Ct. at 953-54. The Wiggins Court noted that standby
counsel may "assist the pro se defendant in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary
obstacles to the completion of some specific task. . . that the defendant has clearly shown he
wishes to complete." Id at 954 (emphasis added). Hence, the pro se defendant retains
control over the content, or substantive element, of his defense, though standby counsel
may, despite the defendant's objection, interfere to help with procedural and technical
difficulties. Id at 949-50.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1975) (no right to hybrid
representation); United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.) (no right to proceed
pro se and with counsel simultaneously), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); United States
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permit coordination of attorney and client participation stems from a
preference for the more orderly conduct of trials by trained professionals, and from a fear that minimizing the role of counsel will dissuade competent attorneys from pursuing criminal defense work.6 7
Hence, when standby counsel participates too actively in a defense,
some courts have held that a defendant thereby waives the right to
appear pro se.68
In contrast, some courts have implicitly recognized the right to
counsel and the right to self-representation as opposites on a continuum that permits combinations of the two in various proportions.6 9
Courts recognizing such combinations, termed "hybrid representation, '7 allow greater integration of representative effort without an
attendant risk of forfeiture of the defendant's right to participate in
his own defense." With hybrid representation, the degree of counsel's involvement is determined by the defendant according to his
needs. 72 Because it seeks to ensure a meaningful accommodation of a
defendant's right to appear pro se and with the aid of counsel, hybrid
representation contemplates the active participation of both defendv. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973) (rights to counsel and self-representation
cannot actively coexist); United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904, 907-08 (6th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970). See also United States v. O'Clair, 451 F.2d 485 (1st Cir.
1971) (per curiam), wherein the court declared that
[a] defendant is free to offer advice to his appellate counsel, who may or may
not act upon it as he, in his judgment, may decide. Beyond that, in the
absence of a showing of serious default on the part of counsel, we recognize
only two alternatives. Either the defendant is, for some unusual reason,
qualified to conduct his own appeal, or he is not. If he feels qualified, he
may choose to represent himself. If he is not qualified, then he is represented
by counsel. He may make written suggestions to counsel, but counsel is
under no duty to accept them, or even to explain, unless he wishes to, why
he does not.
O'Clair, 451 F.2d at 486.
67 Note, Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 57 B.U.L. REV. 570, 579

n.25 (1977).
68 See United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904, 908 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958
(1970). Likewise, a pro se defendant may be denied his right to self-representation if
counsel, over defendant's objection, interferes too much in the presentation of the pro se
defense. See supra notes 63 & 65.
69 See, e.g., Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendant and
counsel both actively participated during trial), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976, affdon rehearing,
437 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968) (counsel performed voir dire for defendant and gave advice during trial); Bayless v. United
States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967) (attorney assisted defendant with cross-examination).
70 United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1975); see Note, supra note 67, at
570.
71 See cases cited supra note 69; see also Note, supra note 67, at 573 (hybrid representation poses no threat of forfeiture as it is expected that counsel actively participate in,
though not control, trial).
72 See United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968).
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ant and attorney.73

THE RIGHT TO "EFFECTIVE"

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In the other branch of case law, the right to counsel has consistently been recognized by the Supreme Court as conferring a guarantee of effective assistance;7 4 however, precisely what constitutes
ineffectiveness has been the subject of various definitions and debate. 75 The inconsistency that has traditionally prevailed among
general standards of effectiveness is attributable to the extrapolation
of those standards from two different constitutional guarantees: the
right to due process and the right to counsel.7 6 Due process analyses
yielded the "farce and mockery" standard.7 7 Since Gideon v. Wain73 Eg., Haslam v. United States, 431 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
976, af'don rehearing, 437 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1971).
74 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."); see
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1941); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446
(1940); see also Powell v. Alabama, 297 U.S. 45, 55 (1932) (defendants without counsel
denied "effective and substantial aid").
75 See generally Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 234-48 (1979); Levine, Toward Competent Counsel, 13 RUTGERS
L.J. 227, 231-44 (1982); Smithburn & Springmann, Effectte Assistance of Counsel: In Quest
of a Uniform Standardof Review, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 502-11 (1981).
76 CompareDiggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.) (due process clause governs effectiveness of counsel; sixth amendment requires only appointment) (overruled by United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), cert. denied,325 U.S. 889 (1945) with
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (sixth amendment requires specific degree of competence). For a comparison of due process and sixth amendmentderived effectiveness standards, see Erickson, supra note 75, at 237-42; Levine, supra note
75, at 235-41; Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 75, at 502-04; Strazzella, supra note
37, at 446-54.
77 See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.) (overruled by United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). Under a due
process analysis, counsel's performance is evaluated in terms of its effect on the fairness
of the entire trial. That effect must be so severely adverse as to render the trial a "farce
and mockery" of justice. Id The assessment of counsel under this standard "focus[es]
. . . not on the individual instances of ineffectiveness during trial [as determinative of a
constitutional violation in and of themselves,] but on the cumulative effect of th[o]se
instances on the trial as a whole." Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 75, at 502, 506;
cf in/fa note 80 (Court's most recent pronouncement of effectiveness standard, though
not as severe as farce and mockery standard, also requires showing of how ineffectiveness
affected trial).
The farce and mockery standard also requires a defendant to show prejudice. See
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1965) (due process violation ordinarily requires showing of prejudice); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984) ("Sixth
Amendment right to counsel exists. . . to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial,"
guaranteed by the due process clauses). But Sf Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 75,
at 506 (criticizing due process approach because it treats defendant's sixth amendment
right as merely element of due process). When the sixth amendment's guarantee of
effective assistance is viewed merely as a component of the much greater right to due
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wrght,78 however, most courts have abandoned that test, adopting
instead some form of a reasonableness standard to gauge the effectiveness of counsel.7 9 Courts utilizing reasonableness standards demand a requisite degree of quality and skill on the part of an
attorney, and failure of counsel to so
provide, if prejudicial, consti80
tutes a denial of effective assistance.
In McMann v. Richardson,8 the Supreme Court tangentially articulated a competency standard while considering whether a guilty
plea may be successfully attacked because it was based on the erroneous advice of counsel.8" The attorneys in McMann advised their clients to plead guilty, anticipating that illegally obtained confessions
would be admitted and would preclude the possibility of success at
trial.8 3 The petitioners argued that their pleas were involuntary because they were offered in reliance on ineffective counsel. 84 The Mcprocess, the right to effective counsel is not really a guarantee, since, in effect, it may be
denied without consequence so long as the greater right is not impaired. Thus, the
Supreme Court's recent declaration that ineffectiveness, to require reversal, must be
such that the possibility of a "just result" is undermined, Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064,
differs from the farce and mockery test only in the degree of prejudice a defendant must
prove.
78 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (rendering right to counsel fundamental right of all defendants by applying it to states through fourteenth amendment).
79 All Federal circuits have abandoned the farce and mockery language and employ
instead a reasonableness standard. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d
Cir. 1983).
80 Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Cooper v. Fitzharris,
586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) "(en banc) (reasonableness standards "avoid[] the
misleading implication that what occurred at the trial and appears on the face of the
record is all that is relevant"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). This method of evaluating effectiveness claims will perforce be changed by the Supreme Court's recent decision
expressly requiring prejudice in order to reverse a conviction on the ground of ineffectiveness. Where an ineffectiveness claim relates specifically to an act or omission of
counsel, a defendant must be prepared to show that "counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced ajust result." Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
That case, which was decided after Barnes, set up a two-part burden of proof when a
defendant alleges ineffectiveness. First, he must show that counsel's performance was
not "reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id at 2065. Second, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [the ineffectiveness],
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 2068. Although Strickland
involved effectiveness at a sentencing hearing, id. at 2057, because the Court found that
type of a proceeding and a trial similar in all relevant respects, see id at 2063-64, it may
be assumed that Stnckland stands as the Court's most recent pronouncement of the standards governing effectiveness at trial.
8t 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
82 Id at 760. The issue in McMann involved the impeachment of guilty pleas motivated by illegally obtained confessions. Id. The Court's comments regarding levels of
attorney effectiveness are dicta. See id. at 771.
83 Id at 769.
84 Id at 761-64.
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Mann Court held that the mere showing of a nexus between an
involuntary confession and a counselled plea of guilty was insufficient to obtain a hearing on a habeas corpus motion unless petitioners could prove that their attorney was incompetent. 5 The Court
noted that proof of such incompetence depended "not on whether a
court would retroactively consider counsel's advice to be right or
wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 8 6 The McMann
Court created a radius within which "the good faith evaluations of a
reasonably competent attorney" on matters inherently incapable of
precise prediction are insulated from charges of ineffectiveness should
the evaluations later prove erroneous.8 7
Despite the McMann Court's use of reasonableness language,88
effectiveness remains an elusive concept with respect to the allocation
of decision making authority between attorney and client on appeal.
Professional codes offer some guidance in defining the rights of defendants and the correlative responsibilities of counsel and suggest
guidelines to help attorneys maintain the required levels of competence.89 Standards devised by the American Bar Association, for example, provide that a criminal defendant has absolute control over
certain aspects of his defense, such as how to plead,' whether to
at 772.
at 771; accordTollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (voluntariness of
plea advised by counsel determined by whether counsel's advice fell within McMann's
"range of competence").
87 McMann, 397 U.S. at 770. The McMann Court noted that the decision made by
trial counsel was one "subject to uncertainty," id,and that a defendant contemplating a
guilty plea "assumes the risk of ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of
the law and facts." Id at 774. The Court reasoned that when an attorney advises a
defendant to plead guilty, relying on a judgment that a confession will be admitted, such
advice does not necessarily render counsel incompetent where he believed that the
probability of admission was high enough to justify his advice. Id at 770.
88 The Court's phrase "reasonably competent attorney," id, has been used as an effectiveness standard by some lower courts. Eg., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325,
1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Marzullo v. Maryland,
dented, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). But cf.
561 F.2d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
McMann, 397 U.S. at 774. The McMann Court declared that a defendant "is bound by
his plea and conviction unless he can. . . prove seriousderelictionson the part of counsel."
Id (emphasis added). Such a strict burden of proof seems little more than a restatement
of the farce and mockery standard. Since McMann, however, the Court has made it clear
that reasonableness is indeed the standard by which an attorney's performance is assessed. See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
89 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Final Draft 1982); STAN85 Id
86 Id

DARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (2d ed.
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) (amended 1980).

1980);

MODEL CODE OF PROFES-

StanStandard 4-5.1(b) (counsel must not unduly

90 STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

dard 4-5.2(a)(i) (2d ed. 1982); see also id
influence client's plea).
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waive the right to a jury,9 whether to testify, 92 and whether to pursue an appeal.93 The ABA standards further protect a defendant's
control over fundamental decisions by requiring that he be appraised
of counsel's dealings with the prosecution, 94 and by making any endeavors to plea bargain contingent upon a client's consent.9 5
Similarly, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 96 provides that the authority to make decisions, other than tactical ones,
resides exclusively with the defendant.9 7 The Model Code makes the
rights of defendants and the duties of counsel truly correlative by
condoning counsel's pursuit of a course of action chosen by his client
even if it is contrary to the dictates of his professional judgment, as
long as the client has been properly advised. 9'
Representation by counsel that violates any of the rights guaranteed defendants will ordinarily be deemed constitutionally deficient. In Francisv. Spraggns,9 9 the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit found defense counsel to be ineffective because,
after the defendant had testified to his innocence, counsel conceded
his client's guilt to the jury, thus vitiating the defendant's right to
control his plea. °° Similarly, counsel's failure to inform a defendant
of a right of appeal and to preserve issues for appeal have been
deemed ineffective assistance of counsel because they effectively
usurp the defendant's right to decide whether to appeal.101
In addition to protecting defendants' rights, both the ABA standards and the Model Code enumerate an attorney's duties to his cli91 Id Standard 4-5.2(a)(ii).
92 Id
Standard 4-5.2(a)(iii); cf id Proposed Standard 4-7.7(a) (attorney must warn
defendant demanding trial, where facts establish guilt, against perjury and must withdraw if defendant insists upon perjuring himself).
93 Id Standard 4-8.2(a).
94 Id Standard 4-3.8.
95 See id Standard 4-6.1 (b).
96 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) (amended 1980).
97

Id EC7-7.

98 Id EC7-5. Of course the action can be neither inconsistent with the law nor frivolous. Id
99 720 F.2d 1190 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
100 Id at 1194. Defense counsel anticipated a guilty verdict because of the strong
evidence against his client and conceded Francis's guilt to avoid appearing inconsistent
at the sentencing hearing. The Eleventh Circuit held that counsel's interest in maintaining his credibility was subordinate to his duty to render a defense consistent with his
client's plea. Id; see also STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 4-1.6 (2d ed. 1982)(counsel's duty is to his client, not his
reputation).
101 Ste Wilson v. United States, 554 F.2d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)(failure
to inform a defendant of right to appeal); Robinson v. Wyrick, 635 F.2d 757, 758 (8th
Cir. 1981) (failure to preserve issues for appeal).
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ent. Counsel is duty bound, for example, to keep his client
informed 0 2 and honestly advised, 10 3 to investigate potential lines of
defense," °4 and to explore alternatives to disposition of the case at
trial. 10 5 Counsel's paramount obligation, however, is fidelity to the
interests of his client. 0 6 An attorney's breach of any of these duties
will often render the assistance provided constitutionally ineffective.10 7 In King v. Strickland,0 8 for example, the Eleventh Circuit
found a denial of effective assistance where defense counsel divorced
himself from his client's cause by conveying to the jury his reluctance
to represent one who had committed a heinous crime.19
With respect to decision making authority, the ABA standards
expressly provide, and courts overwhelmingly agree, that strategic
and tactical decisions are exclusively within counsel's discretion.1 10
Courts have categorically refused to find counsel ineffective for making reasonable tactical decisions, even when those decisions are later
shown to have been erroneous."' Reasonable mistakes in judgment
are permitted-counsel cannot always correctly anticipate the consequences of an adopted strategy. 1 2 Hence, the instances in which a
court will premise a finding of ineffectiveness on the prudence of a
tactical decision are rare. Such a finding ordinarily requires a show102 STANDARDS RELATING

TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

Stan-

dard 4-3.8 (2d ed. 1982); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC7-7
(1979). The ABA drafters noted that attorneys "must remember that the case is the
defendant's case and he is entitled to know of [counsel's] progress." STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.8 (2d ed. 1982) (emphasis in original).
103 STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.1(a) (2d ed. 1982).
104 Id Standard 4-4.1.
105 Id Standard 4-6.1(a).
106 See id Standard 4-1.6 (client's interests are paramount); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC7-7 (1979) (counsel's duty is to zealously advocate client's
cause).
107 See infia text accompanying notes 108 & 109.
108 714 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1983).
109 Id at 1491.
110 STANDARDS

RELATING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

Stan-

dard 4-5.2(b)(2d ed. 1982); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC7-7
(1979). For examples of court decisions that agree with the ABA standards, see cases
cited t fra note 111.
II1 See, e.g., Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719, 726 (8th Cir. 1983) (attorney not ineffective when hindsight reveals reasonable judgment mistaken); id at 726-27 (wellfounded strategical decision cannot be premise of ineffectiveness claim, even if later
proven imprudent); United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1983) (waiver
of opening statement a strategic decision insufficient to support ineffectiveness claim);
Hubbard v Jeffies, 653 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1981) (attorney's decision not to object to
prosecutor's inflammatory summation was part of successful trial strategy).
112 See, e.g., McMann, 397 U.S. at 770, 774.
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ing that counsel's decision was so profoundly lacking a reasonable
foundation as to be "patently" ineffective" 3 and that that ineffectiveness clearly prejudiced the defendant." 14 In UnitedStates v. Salovitz, '5
for example, an attorney's election to waive an opening statement
was declared by the Second Circuit to be a "simple matter of trial
strategy. . . [which] ordinarily will
not form the basis for a claim of
' 16
counsel.""
of
assistance
ineffective
At the appellate level, applicable ABA standards provide that
the authority to decide whether to appeal, as well as whether to urge
a particular claim on appeal, rest ultimately with the defendant once
counsel has fulfilled his duty to explain the implications of the client's decision.11 7 In the few instances in which the authority to
choose issues on appeal has been considered, however, courts have
refused to impose on appellate counsel any duty to accommodate the
wishes of their clients. In Holcomb v. Murphy,"' the Tenth Circuit
held that appellate counsel's failure to raise specific issues which were
requested by the defendant did not constitute a denial of the latter's
right to appeal.'
The Holcomb court, however, did not address
whether such failure alone diminished counsel's effectiveness. In
Hooks v. Roberts,'20 the Fifth Circuit asserted that appointed appellate
counsel is not "constitutionally required to confer with his client
about the legal issues to be presented on appeal."'' The Hooks court
did acknowledge, though, that counsel's failure to raise particular issues on appeal, if those issues are of "sufficient merit," might render
counsel's performance ineffective.' 2 2 The court did not specify that a
113 E.g., Birt v. Montgomery, 709 F.2d 690, 701-02 (11 th Cir. 1983) (counsel ineffective where decision not to traverse jury was not "fully informed strategic decision");
Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1446 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (counsel's tactical decision
must be patently unreasonable to be ineffective).
114 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067-70 (1984)(requiring showing of
"reasonable probability" that ineffectiveness affected outcome of proceeding).
115 701 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1983).
116 Id at 20-21.
117 STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, CRIMINAL APPEALS Standard 213.2 commentary (2d ed. 1980). That standard provides that
[w]hen, in the estimate of counsel, the decision of the client to take an appeal, or the client's decision to press a particularcontention on appeal, is incorrect[,
c]ounsel has the professional duty to give to the client fully and forcefully an
opinion concerning the case and its probable outcome. Counsel's role, however,
is to advise. The decision is made by the client.
Id (emphasis added).
118 701 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1983).
119 Id at 1309.
120 480 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1973).
121 Id at 1196-97.
122 Id
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finding of ineffectiveness under such circumstances would be predicated on counsel's breach of a defendant's decision making authority.
Hooks thus suggests that the assistance provided by assigned appellate
counsel may be judged ineffective on the basis of the impropriety of a
tactical decision-the actual choice of issues-rather than because
counsel's choice constituted a misappropriation of decision making
authority. 123
While the guidance afforded by ABA codes is certainly helpful,
they seek to establish and maintain are ultimately only
standards
the
expressions of the profession's ideals; noncompliance will not neces4
sarily render an attorney's service constitutionally deficient.' 2 Despite this limitation, professional codes and practices figured
prominently in the Supreme Court's analysis in Barnes.' 25 The Court
defendrefused to recognize, however, a constitutional right granting
126
Barnes.
David
by
demanded
ants the type of discretion
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, emphasized at the
outset those benefits of representation that had previously compelled
the Court to deem the right to counsel fundamental. 2 7 The Chief
Justice noted the Douglas Court's recognition of the marked advantages of an attorney's expert insight and training in the law-the impetus for requiring appointment of counsel for indigents on an
Yet, the majority contended, those benefits
appeal as of right.
were precisely the ones jeopardized by the Second Circuit's adoption
of a per se rule which "seriously undermine[d]" an attorney's freedom to exercise, and to act in accordance with, his professional
judgment. 129
The Barnes Court perceived freedom to exercise professional
judgment as particularly essential on appeal, claiming "[t]here
[could] hardly be any question" of the importance of counsel's evaluation of the record to ascertain the most viable issues for appellate
review. 131 Chief Justice Burger noted that limitations on brief and
123 The Hooks court, after suggesting that a failure to raise certain issues might result
in ineffectiveness, i.,evaluated the claims petitioner alleged appellate counsel should
have raised. Id at 1197-98. The court found they were without merit and therefore
could not serve as the bases for a claim of ineffectiveness. Id

124

See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3313 n.6; id at 3317 & nn.4-5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id at 3312, 3314. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Powell, White, and Stewart, wrote the majority opinion, which was concurred in by
Justice Blackmun. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.
125
126

127

Id at 3312.

128
129

See id
Id

130

Id at 3313.
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argument length, which are routinely imposed by appellate courts,
may preclude attorneys from addressing potentially meritorious arguments.1 3 ' In light of those limitations, the Court reasoned, attorneys are required to distinguish those issues that are most likely to
succeed on appeal. 1 32 Moreover, the Chief Justice observed, established notions of effective appellate advocacy have long recommended that counsel prioritize issues and choose only the most
promising for review. 133 The Barnes majority maintained that the
wisdom of its delegation to counsel of ultimate control over the selection of issues was corroborated by professional code provisions conferring upon defense attorneys exclusive authority to make "strategic
134
and tactical decisions" regarding the presentation of a defense.
Lastly, Chief Justice Burger emphatically rejected the Second
Circuit's interpretation of Anders.'35 Anders's mandate that appointed
attorneys not be permitted summarily to abandon appeals they believe to be frivolous did not, the Court asserted, lend any support to
the circuit court's holding that failure to argue nonfrivolous claims
requested by a client was similarly proscribed. 136 To the contrary,
compliance with Anders's decree that counsel "support [a] client's appeal to the best of [one's] ability" was impeded, the Barnes majority
to choose issues in acopined, when appellate counsel was not 1 free
37
judgment.
professional
his
with
cordance
Justice Blackmun concurred with the Court's judgment but expressed his belief that an attorney is ethically required to implement
131

Id at 3312.

132 See id
133 Id at 3312-13. The Barnes Court opined that presenting a multitude of arguments
poses the initial risk that no one issue will be adequately addressed, id at 3313 (quoting
R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 266 (1981)), as well as the
additional risk that the most favorable arguments will be obscured or diluted by the
aggregate. Id; see also id at 3313 n.5 (Second Circuit practice manual advises against
assertion of more than three or four issues in brief). The majority further warned that
presenting too many issues on appeal "hint at [a] lack of confidence in any one." Id at
3313 (quoting Jackson, 4dvocacy Before the Supreme Court, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 115, 119 (1951)).
134 Id at 3313 n.6 (citing STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1982)). But cf id at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan maintained that the majority had erroneously referred to an ABA
provision governing allocation of decision making power at trial. Id For the ABA standards Justice Brennan found applicable, see infra note 161.
135 Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312-13.
136 Id
137 See id at 3314 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). Chief Justice Burger maintained
that "impos[ing] on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested
by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy that underlies
,4nders." Id But cf. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 ("Counsel [must act] in the role of an active

advocate in behalf of his client. ..

.
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his client's preferences on appeal once the client has been advised.'
Yet, Justice Blackmun maintained, compliance with the Constitution requires only that counsel " 'assure[] the indigent defendant an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the
State's appellate process,' "139 and that counsel render legal services
that fall " 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.' ,,~ The concurrence posited that, should an exercise
of decision making authority render an attorney's performance deficient under either of these standards, a constitutional question suitable for habeas corpus review might be presented.' 4 ' Once
compliance with these standards was established, however, Justice
Blackmun believed that allocation of authority became strictly an
ethical issue.' 42 A different problem, he cautioned, arises when an
attorney refuses to accede to a client's request that a constitutional
claim be argued on appeal. 43 The concurrence believed that such a
refusal could render counsel's assistance ineffective and thus may appropriately be remedied by a writ of habeas corpus.14
Justice Brennan, dissenting, strongly objected to what he contended was the majority's misappropriation of decision making authority that properly resides with a defendant. 45 Arguing that the
wishes of properly advised defendants should control the selection of
issues on appeal, 146 the dissent emphasized a defendant's strong per138

Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing STANDARDS

ING TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL APPEALS

RELAT-

Standard 21-3.2 commentary (2d ed.

1980)).
139 Id (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974)).
140 Id (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771).
14' Id
142 Id Justice Blackmun concluded that Melinger had complied with both McMann
and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), and was therefore effective. Barnes, 103 S. Ct.
at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
143 See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3314 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's analysis thus distinguished the following two habeas corpus claims: failure of counsel to raise
a requested constitutional issue on appeal (which renders important the constitutional
status of the issue), and failure of counsel to satisfy the constitutional standard of competence as a result of a misallocation of authority (which emphasizes the constitutional
status of counsel's perfomance). See id
144 Id
145 Id at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan contended that
[w]hat is at issue [in Barnes] is the relationship between lawyer and clientwho has ultimate authority to decide which nonfrivolous issues should be
presented on appeal? I believe the right to the "assistance of counsel" carries
with it a right, personal to the defendant, to make that decision, against the
advice of counsel if he chooses.
Id; see also id at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defendants are capable of intelligently
deciding issues for appeal; when they do so their decisions should be honored).
146 Id Justice Brennan would have remanded for a determination of whether Barnes,
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sonal interest in the conduct and outcome of his case.' 4 7 Justice
Brennan urged that the sixth amendment should not be viewed
merely as a right to counsel; rather, he maintained that the paramount interest protected by the provision is a defendant's right personally to defend himself.'4 8 Justice Brennan concluded that the
amendment grants to a defendant ultimate control over appellate
claims.' 49 This conclusion, he asserted, was supported by both the
text of the amendment and previous Supreme Court interpretations
thereof. 150
Justice Brennan construed strictly the right to counsel clause,'
and insisted that the language " '/ajssisanceof counsel' 152 connotes
one called upon only to help a client "mak[e] choices that are his to
make, not to make choices for him."' 5 3 Thus, the dissent reasoned,

the supplementary, or ancillary, role of counsel implied by the provision 1 54 reflects its intended purpose-to protect a defendant's right to
control his own defense.' 5 5
The dissent relied upon Court precedent to fortify its contention
that the sixth amendment was intended primarily to protect the dedespite Melinger's advice to the contrary, did in fact iusit that Melinger raise the nonfrivolous claims Barnes had suggested previously. Id at 3315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
If Barnes had not, Justice Brennan would have found that he was not denied the right to
effective assistance. Id at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147 d. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because "[t]he defendant, and not his lawyer
or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction[,]" the right to defend,
Justice Brennan asserted, is a very personal right. Id (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834).
148 Id. The dissent argued that "the right to counsel is more than a right to have one's
case presented competently and effectively" and that counsel's role is to function in the
capacity of an "assistant" in order to help a defendant exercise his rights. Id
149 Id at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that a defendant's
control over aspects of his defense should be limited only when the exercise of such
control poses conflicts with a "lawyer's conscience, the law, and his duties to the court[,]"
td, or with "the State's interest in a speedy, effective prosecution." Id at 3318 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
150 See id at 3315-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151 See id at 3314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan fervently disagreed
with the majority over the significance of the right to counsel clause, observing that
[t]he import of words like "assistance" and "counsel" seems inconsistent with
a regime under which counsel appointed by the State to represent a criminal
defendant can refuse to raise issues with arguable merit on appeal when his
client, after hearing his assessment of the case and his advice, has directed
him to raise them.
Id
152 Id at 3314 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original)(quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. VI).
153 Id at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154 See id; see also Faretta,422 U.S. at 829-30.
155 See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at
806).
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fendant's "dignity and autonomy."' 156 Noting the Court's previous
acknowledgment that the amendment protects more than "the
State's interest in substantial justice," the dissent maintained that the
amendment guarantees a personal right to defend. 15 Justice Brennan cited Fare//aas illustrative of his position that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to determine the composition of his defense. 158

He reasoned that Anders, which requires appointed attorneys who believe an appeal is meritless to brief nonetheless potentially arguable
claims, is consistent with Fare//a because it affords a defendant the
option of pursuing his appeal pro se if counsel does withdraw.' 5 9 The
dissent observed that its conception of the proper role of counsel-an
"instrument and defender" of a client's right to defend himself - 160
was corroborated by the legal profession's own similarly restrictive
16 1
characterization of its role in the appellate process.
Justice Brennan recognized that the complexity of the modern
legal system makes the assistance of counsel a practical necessity for
most defendants.' 6 2 Yet, the dissent maintained, a defendant's right
to the "autonomy and dignity" necessary to exercise his right personally to defend himself should be compromised no more than is absolutely required to accommodate the "State's interest in a speedy,
effective prosecution. "163 Allowing an attorney to ignore his client's
express request that specific nonfrivolous issues be argued on appeal,
Justice Brennan believed, accomplished precisely the opposite
result. 164
The Supreme Court's analysis of the effectiveness of Barnes's appellate counsel rests on two presumptions. The Barnes Court assumed
that standards developed to address the exigencies of trial are appropriate in an appellate forum,6 5 and it implicitly characterized the
choice of issues for appeal as a purely tactical decision. 66 If both of
these premises are true, then the majority was correct in delegating to
156
157
158
159
160
161

d. at 3316, 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Faretia, 422 U.S. at 744).
Id at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Fareta, 422 U.S. at 834).
Id; accord McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944, 949-50 (1984).
Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id at 3319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing STANDARDS RELATING To CRIMI-

NAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL APPEALS Standard 21-3.2 commentary (2d ed.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC7-7, -8 (1979)).

1980) and

162 Id at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 Id
164 See id at 3318-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 See id at 3313 n.6.
166 See id at 3312-14. The majority spent the greater portion of the opinion discussing the strategic aspects of choosing issues for appeal. See id; see also supra note 133
(discussion of Court's comments on strategy).
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counsel final authority to select issues for appeal, 167 and it should not
be surprising that the Court refused to deem Melinger, who had exercised reasonable judgment in making a "tactical" decision, ineffective. M The Bares majority's delegation of authority was in error,
however, for two reasons. First, the selection of appellate issues
should not be considered purely tactical. The Court failed to recognize, secondly, that a defendant's constitutionally protected interest
in "dignity and autonomy" is invaded when counsel elects not to
raise an issue upon which his client insists.' 69 The Supreme Court
has recognized that a pro se defendant accompanied by standby
counsel retains control over the content of his defense;170 it seems
anomolous to require a defendant to forfeit that autonomy merely
because he avails himself of the "assistance" of counsel.
At the trial level, a defendant's autonomy is not forfeited because he is represented by counsel.' 7 1 His authority to make certain
fundamental decisions"' includes exclusive control over how he will
plead.' 73 The plea is a decision which necessarily shapes the content
of the defense, and power over the plea reflects a defendant's right to
have his "theory" of the case argued at trial.' 74 Counsel may advise
a particular plea as being strategically more prudent,' 75 but because
the decision involves a fundamental right, counsel's "tactical" recommendation may not supersede his client's wishes.' 7 6 A defendant's
insistence that particular nonfrivolous issues be argued on appeal
should similarly be honored as a legitimate invocation of the sixth
amendment's protection of client autonomy."' Once a defendant
rejects the strategic advice of his attorney and opts for presentation of
particular issues, those issues are imbued with a substantive dimenSee Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312.
See id at 3314; supra note I11.
169 See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. High v. Rhay, 519 F.2d
109, 110, 112 (9th Cir. 1975) (failure to raise issues requested by defendant constitutes
denial of equal protection and due process under Anders).
170 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984). For a discussion of McKakle, see supra
notes 63 & 65.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
172 See supratext accompanying notes 90-93 for decisions controlled by a defendant at
trial.
173 See supra notes 90, 99 & 100 and accompanying text.
174 See United States v. DeLoach, 504 F.2d 185, 189, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
175 See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 763 (1970) (counsel recommended
guilty plea anticipating admission of illegally obtained confession).
176 See, e.g., Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1983).
177 Counsel's recommendation as to which issues should be raised is necessarily tactical. Thus, when a client chooses to ignore counsel's advice and insists upon particular
issues, those issues become substantive in nature, as they reflect the defendant's personal
stake in his defense, and are measured by the degree of his insistence.
167
168
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sion-they become the content, or "theory," of the appeal. If the
sixth amendment's protection of "autonomy and dignity" does indeed extend to defendants on appeal, 178 those decisions should be
made by the client, just as they are at trial.
Even if, as the Barnes' majority indicated, the choice of issues for
appeal is a tactical decision, the significant difference between the
dynamics of trial and appellate forums 179 makes parallel treatment of
them unwise. The exigencies that justify trial counsel's control over
tactical decisions are absent in the appellate context. In marked contrast to the appellate forum, compliance with procedural and evidentiary requirements remains a significant concern throughout the
entire course of a trial.'
The decisions that must be made regularly
throughout a trial require spontaneous application of sophisticated
and technical knowledge that is the expertise of lawyers. Hence, the
state's interest in justice and order 18 ' is more acute at the trial stage
and is best served by delegating complete dominion over tactical and
strategic decisions to counsel, who are more capable of serving that
interest. 8 2 Such a delegation prevents situations in which a defendant's lack of expertise in making the tactical decisions that present
themselves at trial diminishes the likelihood of a just result, thereby
threatening the integrity of the judicial system."13
The state's interest in a fair and orderly appellate proceeding is
not as immediate, however, because of the inherent regularity of appellate procedure. The more circumscribed nature of the appellate
proceeding does not require counsel regularly to make tactical decisions in pursuit of a strategy. 184 The only decision required on appeal that might be characterized as "tactical" is the selection of
178 The Supreme Court has recently stated that the right of self-representation "exists
to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused," McKaskle v. Wiggins, 104 S. Ct.
944, 950 (1984), implying that only an accused arguing pro se is afforded the constitutional guarantee of dignity and autonomy. But see Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3316 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (function of counsel is to protect dignity and autonomy of accused);
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 (right to counsel a "defense tool" afforded by sixth amendment
to aid exercise of primary and personal right to defend). The protection of a defendant's
autonomy and dignity should, therefore, be an ever-present concern whether a defendant chooses to proceed pro se or with the aid of counsel.
179 See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (noting some of the differences between trial and appellate
proceedings).
180 See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 See id at 3318 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182 See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1251 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd,

104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
183 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); see Washington v. Strickland,
693 F.2d 1243, 1251 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
184 See Barnes, 103 S.Ct. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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issues. That choice, however, is deliberate; it is made well before
counsel addresses an appellate court. Thus, allowing a defendant to
make the final decision concerning which nonfrivolous claims are to
be raised does not jeopardize the integrity of the system by threatening to disrupt an appeal.
There is a significant difference, therefore, between deferring to
counsel's tactical decisions during trial and on appeal. Such deference at the trial stage protects the state's interest without encroaching upon the fundamental rights of the accused. At the appellate
level, however, such deference is not only unnecessary to serve the
interests of the state, but it frustrates a defendant's autonomy as well.
The Barnes Court's adamant refusal to grant defendants ultimate authority over the determination of issues for appeal was precipitated in part by its fear that such a grant would "seriously
undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional evaluation. 1

1

5

That a defense con-

sistent with counsel's evaluation is necessary to comply with the sixth
amendment was evidenced, the Court indicated, by prior decisions
emphasizing counsel's superior ability to defend.' 8 6 The majority implied that interference with an attorney's professional judgment
could prevent him from satisfying the obligation to render effective
assistance imposed by the sixth amendment. 8 7
This view and its consequent inflation of the role of counsel reflect the Court's confusion of two distinct notions of effectiveness: the
constitutional requirement of effectiveness,' 8 8 and "effectiveness," or
success, in procuring a judgment favorable to a client. The Barnes
majority contended that minimizing the exercise of counsel's professional judgment posed the risk that he might be rendered less "effective" and thus run afoul of the quite different sixth amendment
requirement of effectiveness. 89 Such a restriction may indeed diminish an attorney's "effectiveness" in obtaining favorable judgments,"9
at 3312.
Set id (citing Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358).
187 See id The Court, by not permitting a defendant to forego some of the benefits of
counsel, implied that those benefits were requirements of effective assistance. See infra
note 193.
188 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the sixth amendment's requirement of effective representation.
189 See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312. The Court maintained that Douglas extended the
right to counsel to first appeals as of right because of the benefits of counsel, and implied
that a defendant who was appointed counsel could not refuse those benefits without
jeopardizing an attorney's sixth amendment effectiveness. See id.; see also 1d at 3314
(duty to " 'support [a] client's appeal to the best of [one's] ability' " is hindered when
counsel's exercise of judgment is limited) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).
190 For instance, a defendant might insist on pleading not guilty even though his law185
186
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and perhaps adversely affect his reputation. A defendant, however,
is not required to forfeit decision making authority to accomodate an
attorney's personal interest in his reputation. An attorney's first and
paramount consideration is loyalty to his client, and he is prohibited
from taking a case if his personal interests will interfere with that
loyalty. "9
While the Barnes majority correctly cited Douglas's recognition of
attorney expertise, 192 it attributed more to Douglas than that opinion
would properly allow by indicating that the "effectiveness," or advantages, of representation noted in Douglas cannot be interfered
with. 9 3 Douglas did not render the various benefits of representation
necessary requisites of constitutional effectiveness. Hence, interference with the "effectiveness" that makes access to counsel desirable
does not compromise an attorney's ability to comply with the sixth
amendment.
Since encroachment upon a defendant's autonomy is not necessary to accommodate any interest of the state, a client should have
ultimate authority in the choice of the nonfrivolous issues to be argued in his appeal. An attorney's obligation to provide effective
assistance, with respect to decisions that the client controls, is satisfied when his advice regarding such decisions falls within "the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."' 94
If defendants' increasing reliance upon counsel' 95 reflects confidence in the latter's superior ability to defend them, then Justice
yer, because of overwhelming evidence against his client, advises plea bargaining as the
course likely to yield the lesser punishment.
191 STANDARDS RELATING To CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard EC5-2, n-I (2d ed. 1982).
192 See Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3312 (citing Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58).
193 See id The Court reversed the Second Circuit at least in part because it believed
the lower court's decision would disrupt the benefits of counsel acknowledged in Douglas
and curtail counsel's exercise of professional judgment. Id. Because the Court's desire to
eliminate any such disruption or curtailment was one of the reasons for it holding as it
did, id., the inference can be drawn that it considered the benefits of representation
noted in Douglas as elements of constitutional effectiveness. Similarly, the Court maintained that such interference contravened counsel's duty under Anders. Id.at 3314.
194 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In McMann, counsel's effectiveness in advising a plea-over which a defendant has complete authority-was judged by
whether the advice fell within the "range of competence." Id Likewise, when a defendant relies on counsel's advice regarding the nonfrivolous issues to be argued on appeal,
assuming defendants have ultimate authority over the selection, that advice should be
subject to that same effectiveness standard. It should be noted, however, that if counsel's
recommendations are based on purely tactical considerations, there lies the danger that
the entire subject matter of the appeal will be unassailable because of courts' general
agreement that tactical decisions are ordinarily not challengeable as ineffective. See
supra note 111.
195 See Faretta v.California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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Brennan's contention that they will more often than not accept counsel's advice as to the most favorable issues for appeal' 9 6 is correct.
Those instances wherein a client insists upon pursuing a patently unwise course of action on appeal, contrary to the advice of competent
counsel, should be few. The unlikelihood of such a situation further
justifies honoring a defendant's wish to control the content of his appeal. Regardless, the risks inherent in rejecting counsel's advice are
ones that the sixth amendment permits-the realization of which
does not render counsel's assistance ineffective. To vest counsel with
the authority to make choices affecting client autonomy, solely because his decisions may be more likely to yield advantageous results,
is not contemplated by the sixth amendment's requirement of effectiveness and is contrary to that amendment's primary guaranteeprotection of "autonomy and dignity. '"'9 7
Moira E. Halp'n
Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The result of the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes, that paying defendants are
able to exercise a greater degree of control than indigents over the content of their appeals, may pose future equal protection problems as well. Historically, all rights of indigents on appeal have been the fruits of equal protection violations. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). As the establishment of a constitutional right to an appeal
sems unlikely in the near future, Barnes, 103 S. Ct. at 3315 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
the Court will probably continue to expand indigents' rights on appeal by ensuring
equal access to, and equal quality of, appellate review.
196
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